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Abstract
We open source fingerprint Match in Box, a complete
end-to-end fingerprint recognition system embedded within
a 4 inch cube. Match in Box stands in contrast to a typical
bulky and expensive proprietary fingerprint recognition sys-
tem which requires sending a fingerprint image to an exter-
nal host for processing and subsequent spoof detection and
matching. In particular, Match in Box is a first of a kind,
portable, low-cost, and easy-to-assemble fingerprint reader
with an enrollment database embedded within the reader’s
memory and open source fingerprint spoof detector, feature
extractor, and matcher all running on the reader’s inter-
nal vision processing unit (VPU). An onboard touch screen
and rechargeable battery pack make this device extremely
portable and ideal for applying both fingerprint authenti-
cation (1:1 comparison) and fingerprint identification (1:N
search) to applications (vaccination tracking, food and ben-
efit distribution programs, human trafficking prevention) in
rural communities, especially in developing countries. We
also show that Match in Box is suited for capturing neonate
fingerprints due to its high resolution (1900 ppi) cameras.
1. Introduction
Automated fingerprint identification systems (AFIS) are
now prevalent around the globe providing an accurate and
widely acceptable method for authentication (1:1 match) or
identification and de-duplication (1:N search) of individu-
als [1]. To date, fingerprint recognition systems have been
successfully deployed into a plethora of applications in-
cluding healthcare access, financial transactions, forensics,
border crossing security, national ID systems, and mobile
device access and payments [1]. Despite widespread de-
ployment of fingerprint recognition systems in place of ID
cards and passwords, they still need to overcome some hur-
dles before their further deployments into several niche do-
mains, especially pertaining to applications in developing
countries. These limitations include spoofing vulnerabili-
ties, insufficient resolution for neonate fingerprinting, lack
Figure 1. Match in Box. (a) A working prototype of Match in Box.
Match in Box is a complete, open-source, end-to-end fingerprint
recognition system (with 1900 ppi fingerprint acquisition, spoof
detector, feature extractor, template storage, and 1:N search) em-
bedded within a portable (rechargeable battery and touch screen)
4-inch cube. (b) Assembly of Match in Box requires only low-
cost ($400 USD), ubiquitous, off-the-shelf components, enabling
its easy build and customization for niche applications, particu-
larly in inaccessible locations in developing countries.
of portability, difficult customization, and high cost of hard-
ware and software.
1.1. Spoofing Vulnerability
Fingerprint recognition systems are known to be suscep-
tible to circumvention through “spoofing” attacks1. Finger-
print spoofing is a nefarious act in which a hacker mim-
ics the identity of an unsuspecting victim (through replicat-
ing the victim’s fingerprint with materials such as silicone,
gelatin, and wood glue) in order to gain access to the vic-
tim’s biometric protected data [2, 3]. Any failure of a fin-
gerprint recognition system to automatically detect and flag
1Fingerprint spoof attacks are a subset of “presentation attacks” defined
in ISO standard IEC 30107-1:2016(E) as “presentation to the biometric
data capture subsystem with the goal of interfering with the operation of
the biometric system.”
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Figure 2. Schematic diagrams and example commercial fingerprint recognition system architectures. (a) Match on Host, (b) Match in
Sensor, (c) Match on Card, and (d) the proposed Match in Box, the first open source implementation following the Match in Sensor
architecture, allowing customization to fit application specific needs, particularly in developing countries. Figures for commercial products
retrieved from [4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9].
spoof attacks prior to authentication could result in loss of
personal data and benefits, or preventing proper identifica-
tion of a person of interest (by obfuscating a person’s true
identity).
Given the requirements of accurately detecting finger-
print spoof attacks in most applications, a number of tech-
niques involving both hardware and software have been pro-
posed [10]. In hardware based approaches, additional sen-
sors embedded within the fingerprint readers output/provide
features such as skin color, sub-dermal fingerprints, blood
flow, odor, and heartbeat which can be used to distinguish
live fingers from spoof fingers [10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16,
17, 18]. In contrast to hardware based solutions, software
based techniques do not require special sensors or special
illumination within the fingerprint reader. Instead, soft-
ware based approaches operate by extracting textural [19],
anatomical [20], physiological [21], or learned [22, 23] fea-
tures from images being output by the reader for the purpose
of fingerprint recognition (i.e. the same image is used for
both spoof detection and subsequent recognition). To date,
much work remains to be done in spoof detection research,
especially in detecting spoofs not used during training of
the spoof detectors [24, 25].
1.2. Insufficient Fingerprint Resolution
A limitation of commercial fingerprint readers is that
most only produce 500 ppi fingerprint images, because of
the cost and the targeted adult end users. However, as noted
by Jain et al. in [26], higher fingerprint resolution (> 1000
ppi) is necessary to capture the minute fingerprint details
of a neonate or an infant. Neonate biometric recognition,
especially involving fingerprints, is an area of increasing
interest by governments (e.g. Aadhaar program [27, 28]),
international agencies (e.g. various UN agencies such as
WFP [29], and UNCHR [30]) and NGOs (e.g. Bill and
Melinda Gates Foundation [31]). While commercial 1000
ppi fingerprint reader solutions do exist [32, 33], they can
cost upwards of over $1000 USD, negating the practicality
of their utility in capturing neonate fingerprints, especially
in the developing world.
1.3. Portability
Many fingerprint recognition systems have limited porta-
bility due to their reliance on multiple physical hardware
modules. In a typical “Match in Host” (Fig. 2 (a)) [34]
system, a fingerprint reader acquires the fingerprint image
which is then transferred to a host to perform spoof de-
tection, feature extraction, template storage, and matching.
Although the host offers choice of processors and memory,
the Match in Host design suffers from two main drawbacks:
(i) sensitive biometric data needs to be transferred from the
fingerprint reader to the host and (ii) the system is costly,
bulky, and immobile. These limitations are especially pro-
hibitive to field operations in developing countries (such as
vaccination and health tracking of children, banking, and
benefits distributions) where low cost and portability are es-
sential given the lack of financial resources, electric power
and network reliability.
To solve the limitations inherent to Match in Host archi-
tectures, two newer generations of fingerprint recognition
Table 1: Match in Box vs RaspiReader
Reader
Capture
Time
(seconds)
Capture
Area
(pixels)
Native x
Resolution
(ppi)
Native y
Resolution
(ppi)
Spoof
Detector
Feature Extractor
& Matcher Portability
RaspiReader [11] 1.5 290x267 1594 - 2480 2463 - 3320 on host on host low
Match in Box 0.75 285x357 1917-2962 2900-3768 embedded embedded high
architectures emerged. The first of these architectures has
been termed “Match in Sensor” (Fig. 2 (b)) [34] or alter-
natively described as operating in “Embedded Mode” [6,
7, 35]. Match in Sensor operates entirely (fingerprint ac-
quisition, feature extraction, template storage, matching,
spoof detection) within the processor and memory, embed-
ded within the fingerprint reader. The advantages of this
newer paradigm are; (i) higher security, since fingerprint
data does not need to be transmitted and (ii) greater porta-
bility.
Another fingerprint recognition architecture, known as
“Match on Card” (Fig. 2 (c)) [36, 37], has now been gain-
ing traction. There are two instances of the Match on Card
paradigm (dependent on whether the fingerprint reader is
on the card or not). If the fingerprint reader is not on the
card, a user simply inserts a card into a specialized finger-
print reader which (i) acquires the user’s fingerprint, (ii) ex-
tracts a template from the fingerprint image, and (iii) se-
curely transmits the template to the card where the template
can be securely stored as an enrollment template or used
for matching (authentication) directly on the smart card. If
the fingerprint reader is already on the card, then fingerprint
image acquisition, feature extraction and matching can all
be performed directly on the card.
Both the Match in Sensor and the Match on Card
paradigms solve some of the limitations inherent to Match
in Host. However, the commercial products available for
Match in Sensor and Match on Card still have several limi-
tations of their own, especially as it pertains to applications
in developing countries involving identification of tens of
thousands of individuals. These limitations include: inabil-
ity to customize the black box systems, high-cost, insuffi-
cient resolution for neonate fingerprints, and spoofing vul-
nerabilities.
In summary, the advances in spoof detection research,
fingerprint readers, and system mobility have come a long
ways, however, gaps still exist, especially with respect
to utilizing fingerprint recognition technologies in many
emerging and critical applications in the developing world,
including: delivering nutrition to undernourished chil-
dren [44], improving child vaccination coverage [45], and
government distribution programs [28, 46]. Given these
limitations of available commercial fingerprint recognition
systems in many applications specifically relevant to devel-
oping countries, we open source fingerprint Match in Box,
a cost-effective, customizable, mobile, spoof resistant, and
1900 ppi end-to-end fingerprint recognition system aimed
at filling these voids. In particular, the proposed Match in
Box makes several major customizations and improvements
to RaspiReader [11] (Table 1), including:
• Reducing fingerprint image acquisition time and in-
creasing the native fingerprint resolution.
• Embedding a state-of-the-art fingerprint spoof detec-
tor, feature extractor, and matcher directly onto the
Match in Box processor through the addition of a Vi-
sion Processing Unit (VPU). Enrollment templates of
up to 10,000 subjects can be stored in the Match in Box
internal memory storage.
• Complete mobility and portability through the addition
of a touch screen, intuitive GUI, and rechargeable bat-
tery pack. The touch screen allows for easy enroll-
ment, authentication and metadata access of enrolled
subjects.
• Experimental results demonstrating capability of
Match in Box for (i) spoof detection, (ii) finger-
print matching, and (iii) potential for state-of-the-art
neonate fingerprint recognition.
2. Match in Box Hardware
In assembling Match in Box, the following hardware de-
sign choices (including image acquisition hardware, proces-
sor and memory requirements for Match in Sensor capabil-
ities, and peripherals for portability) are made to best meet
our objective of prototyping an open source, spoof resis-
tant, high-resolution, portable, customizable, low-cost, end-
to-end fingerprint recognition system. Table 2 lists all the
hardware components that were used to assemble Match in
Box. Except for the casing that was custom fabricated using
a Stratasys Objet350 Connex [47] 3D printer, all other com-
ponents to construct the reader are available off-the-shelf.
2.1. Image Acquisition Hardware
To make Match in Box spoof resistant, we follow the
success of RaspiReader in using two cameras for fingerprint
image acquisition. In particular, one camera captures a col-
orful, direct image of the finger in contact with the glass
Table 2: Primary Components Used to Construct Match in Box. Total cost is $400 USD (as of April 1, 2018)
Component Image Name and Description Quantity Cost (USD)
Raspberry Pi Compute Module 3 Lite [38]: A single board computer
(SBC) with 1.2 GHz 64-bit quad-core CPU, 1 GB RAM, MicroSDHC
storage, and Broadcom VideoCore IV Graphic card
1 $29.95
Raspberry Pi Compute I/O Board [39]: Compute Module breakout board 1 $114.95
Pi Camera v2 [40]: 8 Megapixel, 30 frames per second 2 $29.95
Intel Neural Compute Stick [41]: Intel Movidius VPU processor 1 $80.43
Touch Screen [42]: 5-inch TFT touch screen 1 $74.95
Rechargeable Battery [43]: 10,000 mAh lithium ion battery 1 $39.95
platen (useful for spoof detection) while the second cam-
era captures a high contrast, frustrated total internal reflec-
tion image (useful for both spoof detection and subsequent
fingerprint matching) (Figs. 3, 4). Unlike RaspiReader,
Match in Box uses the Raspberry Pi Compute Module 3
Lite (CM3L) to capture two still-images or video streams
simultaneously.
The CM3L Raspberry Pi is a single board computer
(SBC) which, when used in conjunction with the Raspberry
Pi Compute Module I/O board and two 8 MP Raspberry
Pi v2.0 cameras, is capable of capturing two still-images
or video streams simultaneously in 0.75 seconds. Further-
more, the 8 MP cameras increase the fingerprint pixel reso-
lution of Match in Box to 1917 ppi - 2962 ppi in the x-axis
and 2900 ppi - 3768 ppi in the y-axis. This extremely high
native resolution makes this affordable fingerprint recogni-
tion system extremely well suited for neonate fingerprint
recognition.
2.2. Processors and Memory
An extremely vital and useful feature of Match in Box is
its capability to perform fingerprint spoof detection and au-
thentication (1:1 comparison) or identification (1:N search)
directly on-board the fingerprint reader. To enable this func-
tionality, Match in Box is equipped with a 32 Gigabyte
SD card for storing approximately 10,000 fingerprint tem-
plates and associated user meta-data on device. Addition-
ally, the processing speed of Match in Box is accelerated
through the addition of the Intel Movidius Neural Compute
Stick (NCS). The NCS is a low-power vision processing
unit (VPU) designed with 12 specialized vector processing
units, called SHAVES, for accelerating deep learning on the
edge. The NCS is compatible with popular deep learning
libraries Tensorflow and Caffe and is connected to USB.
As such, the NCS is also compatible with the CM3L Rasp-
berry Pi hardware and our Convolutional Neural Network
(CNN) based spoof detection and fingerprint feature extrac-
tion software modules (both implemented in Tensorflow).
While, one CNN inference of our “light-weight” spoof de-
tection model (MobileNet) takes 475 milliseconds to run on
the Match in Box CPU, an inference on the Match in Box
VPU (NCS) takes a mere 58 milliseconds, an almost ten-
fold speedup.
2.3. Portability Peripherals
Finally, in order to make Match in Box a completely
portable and standalone system, we add a rechargeable bat-
tery pack (with the capability of powering a Raspberry Pi
for up to 15 hours) and a 5-inch, 800x480 thin film transis-
tor (TFT) touch screen.
All of these primary components are assembled together
in accordance with the schematic diagram shown in Figure
3. Given a basic knowledge of circuits and programming,
the entire device can be fabricated in under one hour. Upon
completion of assembly, Match in Box is ready for finger-
print image acquisition, spoof detection, feature extraction,
and matching in any location.
3. Match in Box Software
The Match in Box software is comprised of four main
modules: fingerprint image acquisition, fingerprint spoof
detection, fingerprint feature extraction and matching (1:1
verification and 1:N search), and a Graphical User Interface
(GUI) for enrolling users and subsequently displaying user
meta-data. Each of these modules are further explained in
the following subsections.
3.1. Fingerprint Acquisition
The primary software involved in fingerprint image ac-
quisition is the calibration of a raw FTIR image (e.g. Fig.
4b) into a processed, grayscale FTIR image which can be
used for fingerprint matching. Following the same steps as
reported in [11], a raw FTIR fingerprint image is converted
into a grayscale matching image by (i) RGB to grayscale
conversion, (ii) contrast enhancement via histogram equal-
ization, (iii) perspective transformation, and (iv) scaling to
Figure 3. Schematic diagram of Match in Box.
the required fingerprint resolution (500 ppi for adults or
1900 ppi for neonates). As in [11], the perspective trans-
formation and scaling parameters are obtained using a 2D
printed checkerboard pattern to estimate the source and des-
tination coordinate pairs needed to estimate the transforma-
tion parameters.
(a) (b)
Figure 4. Match in Box captures two fingerprint images of a user’s
finger from two different cameras. (a) Direct image of the finger
for spoof detection; (b) high-contrast FTIR image for both spoof
detection and matching.
3.2. Spoof Detector
The Match in Box spoof detector employs two Mo-
bileNet CNNs to classify an input fingerprint image as live
or spoof. In particular, one MobileNet CNN is trained to
make a binary classification (live or spoof) given an input
image from the direct view camera (Fig. 4a) of Match in
Box, and a second MobileNet CNN is trained to make a bi-
nary classification (live or spoof) given an input image from
the FTIR view camera (Fig. 4b) of Match in Box. Finally,
the scores generated by each of these respective CNN mod-
els are fused using the max rule [48].
3.3. Feature Extractor and Matcher
Upon completion of fingerprint spoof detection, finger-
print images which are determined to be “live” are passed
to the Match in Box feature extractor. The embedded Match
in Box feature extractor operates in two main steps. First, a
Convolutional AutoEncoder (CAE) is utilized to locate the
(x, y) locations and orientations of the input fingerprint’s
minutiae points. Then, in a manner similar to [49], a 96x96
patch is cropped around each located minutiae point and
passed to a MobileNet CNN to extract a minutiae descrip-
tor. The collection of all extracted minutiae descriptors
Figure 5. The Match in Box GUI is displayed on a 5-inch, 800x480 touch screen.
comprise the template used by the Match in Box embedded
matcher.
To match two templates in Match in Box, pairwise co-
sine similarity scores are first computed between the sets of
minutiae descriptors comprising each template. Using these
similarity scores, the top 120 minutiae descriptor pairs are
selected and further filtered into a final set S using a graph
matching algorithm. Finally, a match score is produced by
summing the cosine similarity scores between all pairwise
minutiae descriptors in S.
3.4. GUI
The Match in Box GUI was developed using the pop-
ular Electron framework. Electron enables building cus-
tom desktop applications using a combination of Javascript,
HTML, and CSS. Due to the simplicity, cross-platform de-
ployment capabilities, and modern UI/UX of the frame-
work, it has been extensively used [50]. For Match in Box,
we specifically develop a light-weight GUI allowing (i) sub-
ject enrollment, (ii) verification or search, and (iii) retrieval
and display of subject meta-data (Fig. 5).
4. Experimental Analysis
With the Match in Box fully assembled and operational,
we conduct several experiments demonstrating its (i) spoof
resistance, (ii) matching performance, and (iii) neonate fin-
gerprint acquisition capability. These experimental results
and analyses are further enumerated in the following sec-
tions.
4.1. Spoof Detection
To demonstrate the spoof detection capability of Match
in Box, we first constructed a dataset of both live and spoof
finger impressions (Tables 3, 4) (Fig. 6). In particular, we
fabricated nearly 1,800 spoofs from three different materials
(clear ecoflex, flesh-pigmented ecoflex, and 2D printed pa-
per). The spoof materials were carefully chosen based upon
their nominal optical and mechanical similarity to the hu-
man skin. In addition, we collected live finger impressions
from a diverse population (race, occupation, age) of 56 hu-
man subjects. Finally, the live finger impressions and spoof
finger impressions were split into 5 training (80% of impres-
sions) and testing (20% of impressions) splits. Using these
training and testing splits in conjunction with the Match in
Box spoof detector, we demonstrate the robust spoof detec-
tion capability of Match in Box by computing a mean True
Accept Rate (TAR) of 98.46% over the 5-folds at a False
Accept Rate (FAR) of 0.2% (standard deviation is 2.5%).
Note, the time to perform spoof detection on Match in Box
is approximately 120 milliseconds due to the fast inference
time available through the on-board VPU.
Table 3: Summary of Spoof Dataset
Material
# Training
Impressions
# Testing
Impressions
Clear Ecoflex 603 151
Pigmented Ecoflex 832 208
2D Paper 333 84
Total 1,768 443
Table 4: Summary of Live Dataset
Subjects
# Training
Impressions
# Testing
Impressions
56† 2,240 560
† For each subject, 5 impressions were cap-
tured from all 10 fingers.
(a) (b) (c) (d)
Figure 6. Match in Box: spoof detection examples. (a) False De-
tect (live misclassified as spoof) due to the excessively pink color
of the subject’s finger. (b) False Reject (spoof misclassified as live)
due to the close approximation in color of the spoof to human skin.
(c, d) True Detect (spoof classified as spoof) and True Reject (live
classified as live) examples, respectively.
4.2. Matching
Both authentication (1:1 comparison) and identification
(1:N search) performances are reported for Match in Box.
As a baseline, we also report the authentication and identi-
fication performance when using the Match in Box finger-
print images in conjunction with the well-known and popu-
lar COTS Innovatrics SDK [51].
Using the fingerprint impressions enumerated in Table
4, we compute the ROC for authentication and the CMC for
identification from 5,600 genuine scores and 156,520 im-
poster scores. From the ROC, we extract True Accept Rates
of 98.0% and 98.57% at a FAR of 0.01%, using Match
in Box and Innovatrics, respectively (Table 5). From the
CMC, we extract rank one identification rates of 99.1%
and 98.9%, using Match in Box and Innovatrics, respec-
tively (Table 6). Both of these results, while reported on a
small database, demonstrate the ability of Match in Box to
perform state-of-the-art fingerprint authentication and iden-
tification. Note, time to perform authentication on Match in
Box is approximately 600 milliseconds and time to perform
identification from a gallery of 10,000 subjects is less than
2 minutes.
Table 5: Verification Performance
Matcher False Accept Rate True Accept Rate
Innovatrics 0.1% 99.0%
Innovatrics 0.01% 98.6%
Match in Box 0.1% 98.6%
Match in Box 0.01% 98.0%
Table 6: Identification Performance
Matcher
Rank-1
Identification Rate
Rank-5
Identification Rate
Innovatrics 98.9% 99.5%
Match in Box 99.1% 99.5%
(a) (b) (c) (d)
Figure 7. Match in Box: failure matching cases. (a, b) Finger-
print image pair resulting in a False Accept, due to close similarity
between the imposter fingerprints. (c, d) Fingerprint image pair
resulting in a False Reject due to capturing different portions of
the fingerprints in consecutive captures.
(a) (b) (c) (d)
Figure 8. Match in Box: successful matching cases. (a, b) Fin-
gerprint image pair resulting in a True Accept. (c, d) Fingerprint
image pair resulting in a True Reject.
4.3. Neonate Fingerprints
We demonstrate the utility of Match in Box for collect-
ing high quality neonate fingerprints due to its 1900 ppi
cameras. To conduct this experiment, we capture the right
thumb print of a 3-month old infant on (i) the 500 ppi Digi-
tal Persona U.are.U 4500 HD, (ii) a custom 1270 ppi finger-
print reader designed by NEC [32] for neonate fingerprint
acquisition [26], and (iii) our proposed 1900 ppi Match in
Box. As is shown in (Fig. 9 (i)), the 500 ppi Digital Per-
sona is not able to capture all the minute details of the in-
fant’s fingerprints. The 1270 ppi, custom NEC reader per-
forms well in capturing a high quality fingerprint image,
however, closer inspection reveals lack of separation be-
tween the ridges and valleys around the peripheral of the
fingerprint (Fig. 9 (ii)). In contrast, the 1900 ppi Match in
Box (Fig. 9 (iii)) is able to capture the entire infant finger-
print, with clean separation between the ridges and valleys
throughout the fingerprint image. Furthermore, Match in
Box is able to capture more pore information than the NEC
reader.
Finally, we generate match scores between multiple im-
pressions of the infant’s fingerprint as captured by Match
in Box and the custom NEC reader (Figs. 10, 11). Using
Verifinger 6.3, match scores of 161 and 107 are computed
for the fingerprint image pairs acquired by Match in Box
and the NEC reader, respectively (score threshold of Ver-
(i) Digital Persona U.are.U 4500 HD (500 ppi) (ii) Custom NEC Reader [26] (1270 ppi) (iii) Match in Box (1900 ppi) 
rig
ht
 th
um
b
Figure 9. Fingerprint images of the right thumb of a 3 month old infant captured with (i) the 500 ppi Digital Persona U.are.U 4500 HD, (ii)
a custom, NEC designed, 1270 ppi fingerprint reader for neonate fingerprint acquisition [26] and (iii) our 1900 ppi Match in Box.
(a) (b)
Figure 10. Fingerprint images of the right thumb of a 3 month old
infant captured by Match in Box (a, b). Verifinger 6.3 was used
to generate a match score of 161 between (a) and (b). The score
threshold of Verifinger at 0.01% FAR is 33.
ifinger at 0.01% FAR is 33). The annotated minutiae points
in Figures 10 and 11 indicate that the high resolution Match
in Box fingerprints are less susceptible to spurious minutiae
than the NEC reader fingerprints.
While our initial experiments are qualitative, we posit
that our early findings show tremendous promise for uti-
lizing Match in Box for state-of-the-art neonate fingerprint
recognition, an area of increasing interest around the world
by governments, international agencies, and NGOs alike.
5. Conclusion
We have designed and prototyped a complete, spoof
resistant, 1900 ppi, fingerprint recognition system, called
Match in Box, embedded within a portable form factor.
Match in Box is easy and cost-effective to reproduce given
the open source software and off-the-shelf components used
to construct the device. Our experimental results demon-
(a) (b)
Figure 11. (a, b) Fingerprint images of the right thumb of a 3
month old infant captured by NEC [32] (a, b). Verifinger 6.3 was
used to generate a match score of 107 between (a) and (b). The
score threshold of Verifinger at 0.01% FAR is 33.
strate that Match in Box is able to achieve fast, state-of-the-
art fingerprint spoof detection, authentication, and identifi-
cation on device. We have also shown the utility of Match
in Box for neonate fingerprint recognition. In the future, we
will field test Match in Box at a site in India, where we will
specifically target capturing neonate fingerprints of a large
number of subjects in a longitudinal study. In doing so, we
hope Match in Box will push the boundaries of state-of-the-
art neonate fingerprint recognition. We also plan to add a
face camera and face matcher to Match in Box, enabling
multi-modal biometric fusion and recognition2.
2This research was supported by the Office of the Director of National
Intelligence (ODNI), Intelligence Advanced Research Projects Activity
(IARPA), via IARPA R&D Contract No. 2017 - 17020200004. The views
and conclusions contained herein are those of the authors and should not
be interpreted as necessarily representing the official policies, either ex-
pressed or implied, of ODNI, IARPA, or the U.S. Government. The U.S.
Government is authorized to reproduce and distribute reprints for govern-
mental purposes notwithstanding any copyright annotation therein.
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